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RANSOMWARE:

A look at the criminal art of malicious code, pressure and manipulation



V 2.0

Author: Ondrej Kubovič

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Author: Ondrej Kubovič

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Original Author: Stephen Cobb

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GOALS

The goals of this paper are to demonstrate how dangerous ransomware has become, describe the latest techniques used by ransomware gangs, and suggest what your organization can do to reduce exposure to, and damage from, ransomware attacks. Three ransomware attack vectors are addressed in this order: remote access, email, and supply chain.

RANSOMWARE — CYBERTHREAT AT ITS WORST

A ransomware attack can be defined as an attempt to extort an organization by denying it access to its data. Ransomware is a subset of malware, a collective term for all forms of malicious code, including computer viruses and worms.

Ransomware is probably one of the most serious cyberthreats your organization will face. Why? Because in the past few years criminal gangs creating this type of malware and running ransomware as a service have been perfecting a different, more targeted approach to these kinds of attacks — for which metrics are much harder to obtain.

Cybercriminals are also constantly coming up with new approaches to ensure that they receive the sum they ask for, usually by increasing the pressure on the victim. In 2019, they started to rely on double extortion, which combines the “usual” data encryption with data exfiltration. In this way, they not only prevented access to the victim’s valuable, critical, or otherwise sensitive files, but could also leak or sell them to other malicious actors.

Upping the ante further, some ransomware operators have adopted triple extortion, adding the further step of contacting business partners or customers of victims that have not paid the ransom demand. The cybercriminals inform the victim’s partners/customers that their sensitive data has been accessed as part of the ransomware attack, suggesting these partners/customers pressure the ransomware victim to pay up to prevent this data being released. In some cases, the attackers even demand payment from these partners/customers.

Recent years have seen a shift away from victimizing large numbers of random people while requesting ransom demands of modest sums, toward a targeted approach making much larger ransom demands from a smaller victim pool. That group features deeper pockets and members who can ill afford to lose access to their data or control over it.

2021 headlines of high-profile targets hit by ransomware:

- [*Kaseya was fixing zero-day just as REvil ransomware sprung their attack*](#)
- [*REvil ransomware hits US nuclear weapons contractor*](#)
- [*Ireland’s Health Services hit with \\$20 million ransomware demand*](#)
- [*Cyberattack forces major US fuel pipeline to shut down*](#)
- [*ADATA struck by Ragnar Locker ransomware attack*](#)
- [*City of Tulsa’s online services disrupted in ransomware incident*](#)

A close look at these attacks shows that, the victims come from both public and private sectors across various industries. No enterprise enjoys sectoral immunity from targeted ransomware, and although not the most technically complex of threats, protecting against it is a major concern of many security teams.

RANSOMWARE IS BIG BUSINESS

No one really knows how much ransomware operators make. A search of current industry opinion places the average ransom demands at around \$170,000, [according to Group-IB](#). However, researchers also add that the most brazen groups ask for tens of millions of dollars — Sodinokibi (aka REvil) demanded \$50 million apiece from Acer and Quanta. Other sums include:

- [ENISA ransomware report](#): €10 billion in 2019 payouts;
- [\\$144 million from 2013–2019](#) in payouts to Ryuk, according to the FBI;
- [\\$100 million in 2020](#) in profit, according to Sodinokibi, which may be exaggerated;
- [\\$150 million in 2020](#) paid to Ryuk, according to AdvIntel;
- [\\$40 million in 2021](#) paid to Phoenix Locker by CNA Financial — the highest reported single payout yet;
- [\\$17.5 million in 2021](#) paid to Darkside before “retreating” after the Colonial Pipeline attack;
- [\\$350 million in 2020](#) payouts, according to an estimate by Chainalysis; and
- [\\$70 million in 2021](#) demanded by Sodinokibi for a universal decryptor after the Kaseya VSA attack.

HOW RANSOMWARE DOES IT PSYCHOLOGICALLY

Ransomware uses pressure as its core tactic, and while there are many approaches to ransomware, the primary threat it demonstrates is encrypting important data and putting it out of the victim’s reach. Data, whether considered personal, professional, or intellectual property, is, in any case, sensitive and valuable.

Pressure points expand when individuals or organizations can sustain reputational damage, business outages, or even legal and financial penalties. The risk of such damage has been exacerbated by a new trend — called doxing — employed by multiple ransomware gangs, wherein they comb through their victims’ systems looking for sensitive data that they will then threaten to release unless an additional fee on top of the ransom is paid — a type of double extortion. The Maze gang, which started the doxing trend in November 2019, even improved on its original approach by creating its own underground leak site, making it very difficult for the victims to have their leaked data taken down.

With the pressure applied and — as a rule increasing, manipulation is sure to follow. Victims often see multiple facets of their digital touchpoints affected, from DDoS attacks on their websites to obnoxious demonstrations of criminal presence on a network. Some of these include shock-inducing approaches like [print bombing](#), in which multiple printers on a network are commanded to print a ransom note — threatening management’s ability to control internal and external communication about an incident. Pressure might also be applied more directly; for example by accessing a business’s customer data and then getting in touch, possibly even [cold-calling](#) the victims, with further threats and publicly goading the victims while their IT departments struggle to mitigate impacts from an attack.

These are just some of the calling cards that accompany today’s ransomware campaigns. Simply put, ransomware can turn an unfortunate malware incident into psychological warfare that aims to force victims to act against their own will and best interest. While criminals involved in physical abductions typically start their pressure campaigns with some ace up their sleeves but can run short on options later, cybercriminals have an even wider variety of methods they can pursue to gain leverage and crush any hope of seamless recovery.

To achieve their malicious aims, cybercriminals use a vast number of approaches that potentially allow them to gain remote access, monitor their victims' activities, and then apply surgical, pinpoint pressure. This demonstrates how much power they can achieve over their victims' data, networks, business continuity, and reputation. Indeed, these attacks don't have to come via custom malware, zero-day exploits, or long-term persistence campaigns. They can simply be the result of poor security practices by employees, poor configuration of RDP or other remote access tools, or gaps in practices and processes, within both your organization and that of your service providers or others in your supply chain.

HOW RANSOMWARE DOES IT TECHNICALLY

While ransomware has been a nuisance for more than a decade, the scope for ransomware has expanded throughout the period of digital intensification brought by the COVID-19 pandemic. A clear correlation rapidly emerged between COVID-19 lockdowns and phishing emails that were often based on topical fears of negative business impacts and lost opportunities.

Another manifestation of this phenomenon was employees suddenly working from home and (often for the first time) accessing internal company systems and services via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). This became a wildly popular vector to deliver ransomware. With the admin rights that accompany some cases of RDP use, ransomware can appear alongside a number of other security concerns in a network.

We can also see that wielding ransomware as a tool for digital crime is very much a game of ambition and scale. Less skilled actors can dabble, coding imperfect malicious scripts that will impact a very limited number of victims via spam. Others may try their luck by propagating malicious payloads — including ransomware — via downloaders or botnets. More ambitious actors may pay a fee to use a fully tuned ransomware product and deploy it to earn profit for themselves, becoming affiliates of the ransomware developers through a ransomware as a service (RaaS) business model.

Advanced criminal actors running the RaaS schemes often leverage vulnerabilities to gain access to a machine, then move laterally to a server and on-to the wider network, only later deciding on the use of ransomware. If resource rich, these gangs may purchase zero-day exploits or even develop their own, allowing them to bypass many types of proactive mitigation technologies. Finally, whether through luck, skill, or significant investments of human and financial resources, [attackers can conduct supply-chain attacks to access entire IT ecosystems](#). For example, by commandeering popular managed service provider (MSP) platforms and productivity tools, threat actors can unleash ransomware across multiple networks (and thus organizations) at scale. Leveraging a supply-chain attack to position ransomware is yet another fearsome scenario for businesses to contend with.

An appreciation for the ever-growing variety of approaches and speed with which ransomware can evolve is critical to understanding the security posture necessary to avoid business outages. Innovation in ransomware moves quickly; case in point is when researchers [observed](#) Sodinokibi (aka REvil) ransomware demonstrating file encryption within a PC's Safe Mode that flew under the radar yet required additional user login. [Within a month](#), this novel capability had been improved by changing the login password to the attacker's choice and configuring the PC to automatically reboot and log into Safe Mode, making it a viable vector for a full-scale campaign.

Network-attached storage (NAS) devices, which are commonly used to share files and make backups, have also earned the attention of ransomware gangs. In 2021, the NAS appliance maker QNAP [alerted](#) its customers that eCh0raix ransomware was attacking its NAS devices, especially those with weak passwords. ESET telemetry from Q4 2020 showed that eCh0raix was the most prominent ransomware targeting NAS devices.

RANSOMWARE VIA RDP

An RDP endpoint is a Windows device that is running Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) software so that it can be accessed over a network, such as the internet. RDP enables an organization's Windows devices to be accessed remotely as if their keyboards and displays were on your desk. The benefits of deploying RDP can be several, from managing or troubleshooting employee devices to serving up centralized resources such as desktops that can run heavy workloads, applications, or databases.

Company systems that employees need to access remotely must have RDP enabled, and ideally, mandate platform access via [two-factor authentication](#) (2FA). Employees then connect to these systems by running RDP software; for example on their laptops. When the network address of the remote system is entered, the client software reaches out to the designated port on the remote system (the default port for RDP is 3389, although that can be changed). The remote system presents a login screen that asks for a username and password. You can see what this looks like on a Windows system in [Figure 1](#).




Figure 1 // RDP login screen

There are two main ways in which organizations use RDP:

1. The first is to manage programs running on a server; for example a website or back-end database. In this scenario, the simplest configuration has a system administrator open port 3389 to the outside world to allow remote management.
2. A second use of RDP is to allow remote access to corporate desktops or virtual machines that have access to resources not accessible outside the corporate network. Accessing such systems via RDP means there is no need to directly open sensitive internal servers to the internet. It may also be that desktops in the office have extra processing power needed for many processes or have expensive specialist software needed for staff to complete some (or in some cases most) of their tasks. Again, when this is done over the internet, often port 3389 is opened to the outside world.

For the criminally inclined, finding systems accessible from the outside world and then abusing them for malicious purposes is straightforward because:

- Vulnerable RDP systems are easy to find.
- It is easy for attackers to obtain a foothold on RDP systems if they have poor configuration.
- Many RDP systems have weak configurations.
- Tools and techniques for escalating privilege and obtaining admin rights on compromised RDP systems are widely known and available.

Systems running RDP can be identified by specialized search engines like [Shodan](#), which constantly scour the internet for connected devices and collect information about them. As of June 15, 2021, Shodan indicated that there were over 3 million systems on the internet with port 3389 open (registration may be required to view filtered Shodan queries). As you can see from the Shodan interface in [Figure 2](#), over 1 million of those systems were in the US.




Figure 2 // Over 3 million systems on the internet using port 3389 (Source: Shodan)

Using a [different query](#), over 2.7 million machines were found to be explicitly running RDP. For an attacker, all of these machines are potential targets to be explored. While logging in to an RDP system typically requires a username and password, these can be surprisingly easy for attackers to guess and many will lead to success.

One shortcut for attackers who have sufficient funding is to simply purchase access to compromised RDP systems. Such credentials are available in marketplaces on the dark web. Note that ransomware is not the only reason for buying hacked RDP credentials. Other uses for a compromised RDP system include sending spam, hosting malware, password cracking, mining cryptocurrency, and a range of activities for which anonymity is desirable and attribution is not; think fraudulent purchasing and money laundering.

If only username and password are required to remotely access the device, then an attacker, having identified such endpoint as a target, can make repeated attempts to guess these credentials. Doing so at a high rate, via use of a database of plausible credentials, is referred to as brute-force attack. Absent any mechanism to limit multiple bad guesses, such attacks can be very effective and even lead to a network-wide compromise.

ESET telemetry confirms RDP as one of the most popular attack vectors, with detections surpassing 71 billion between January 2020 and June 2021. While the most notable increase occurred in the first half of 2020, 2021 saw the highest figures yet. When comparing H1 2020 and H1 2021, ESET saw a sixfold growth in detected brute-force attacks against RDP.




Figure 3 // Trends of RDP connection attempts and unique clients between January 2020 and June 2021, seven-day moving average

Gaining unauthorized access from the internet to devices running RDP may require more upfront effort than email-based ransomware, but the RDP vector offers threat actors significant benefits, like misuse of legitimate access, the potential to evade endpoint protections, and the ability to rapidly compromise multiple systems — or even the whole network — within a single organization.

“ Attacks via RDP can fly under the radar of many detection methods, meaning fewer metrics and less threat awareness. ”

For example, any organization with a mature information security program will detect and block a piece of ransomware embedded in a file attached to incoming email. Such incidents are typically logged and reported by endpoint protection programs, and vendors of such programs aggregate anonymized threat trend statistics from such reports.

The same is often true of efforts to trick users into visiting malicious websites propagating ransomware. However, if an attacker with system administrator privileges on a compromised server turns off the endpoint protection software before deploying their ransomware, that attack may well elude typical malware metrics.

Lateral movement and living off the land

For the ransomware attacker, a compromised RDP system can mean much more than extorting money to decrypt the files on that machine. That’s especially true if that system can provide an entry point to an entire network of devices, potentially enabling large-scale encryption or theft of mission-critical data. That’s what happened in many of the headline cases cited earlier, and the techniques for carrying out this type of attack are no secret.

Upon gaining remote access, the attacker will want to learn more about the compromised machine, evaluating its potential for abuse, including mapping connections to other systems. If access was not gained with admin credentials, several techniques can be used to escalate privilege to admin level. If there is endpoint protection installed on the system and it can be turned off by a user with admin privileges, the attacker will likely try to turn it off. This makes it easier for the attacker to download additional software, based on an assessment of the system's potential for abuse. Note that in the following text when actions are described as being performed "by the attacker" they may not be performed by a person at a keyboard but by software used to automate aspects of an attack.

Some attackers will try to introduce as little malicious code as possible in order to minimize the chances of detection. Instead, a strategy of "living off the land" will be employed, using legitimate software, often used by the system's actual administrators, and even standard tools installed with the base operating system, to extend network penetration. For example, PsExec and Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) are often misused to achieve lateral movement in compromised networks. There are valid reasons for these programs to be executed, and so detecting abusive use by an attacker can be difficult, although not impossible. For more information on how to detect them see the discussion of endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools below.

The term lateral movement is used to describe the strategy of gaining a foothold on one system and using that to compromise other devices that can be reached from there. For example, attackers can utilize compromised credentials to target a server not even present in the targeted organization and use its connection to the main infrastructure to deliver the ransomware payload.

In addition to living off the land, [ransomware attacks may take advantage of unpatched vulnerabilities in legitimate system software](#). Perhaps one of the most archetypal examples was WannaCryptor ransomware, which propagated via [EternalBlue exploit](#), misusing high-severity vulnerability in Microsoft's implementation of Server Message Block. Despite patches having been publicly available for approximately two months prior to the WannaCryptor campaign on May 12, 2017, attackers still found and compromised over 200,000 vulnerable machines. Even in the latter stages of this outbreak, infected devices continued to pose threats as, for example, users may have unknowingly brought compromised laptops into what admins felt to be a secure perimeter.




Figure 4 // Top 10 ransomware families in T1 2021 (% of ransomware detections). Four years after its devastating 2017 attack, WannaCryptor still ranks among the most detected ransomware families in the wild (data source: [ESET Threat Report T1, 2021](#))

Of course, it is possible that in some cases an attacker's first point of contact with an organization will be a server running a mission-critical database, in which case an opportunistic criminal may decide to save some time and effort and go for a quick win by simply stealing data, encrypting and ransoming the files used by that one asset. However, a lot can be gained via persistence, so many ransomware operators are likely to continue to perform recon even after the data has been stolen and before encrypting it — just to make sure they have enough leverage.

Defending against RDP ransomware attacks

It is possible to defend systems running RDP against unauthorized access and thus deny criminals this increasingly popular attack vector, whether they are purveying ransomware or engaged in some other abuse of unauthorized system access. While defensive strategies are covered in this section, a more technical checklist of anti-ransomware techniques is provided in the section "[Securing RDP against ransomware.](#)"

Of course, your organization may already have policies in place to address remote access security. You might have rules requiring all RDP access to be routed over a VPN (virtual private network), secured by MFA (multi-factor authentication), limited to specific roles, on specific systems that are configured securely, patched promptly, monitored constantly, firewalled appropriately, and backed up regularly.

However, even if you have such rules in place or are working toward putting them in place, rules alone will not ensure your remote access is not hacked. You still have to make sure everyone is complying with the rules, while also being prepared to handle an attack that somehow succeeds despite those rules.

A foundational first step in defending against RDP ransomware attacks is to make an inventory of your internet-facing assets. To say that you cannot defend a system if you are not aware of its existence might sound like a statement of the obvious, but based on our investigations the following scenario is not that unusual: an organization is attacked via an internet-connected asset that the organization's security staff were not aware of until after that attack.

You need processes in place to ensure that does not happen to your organization. For example, it should not be possible for either a contractor or an employee to connect either a physical or a virtual server to both the organization's network and the internet unless that server is securely configured; said configuration must occur before the server goes live, particularly if the server is running RDP with a domain admin account.

When you have finished creating your inventory of internet-facing assets, you need to document which ones have remote access enabled, and then decide if that access is necessary. If access is necessary, require long passwords for the accounts that will have such access. How long? Passwords of 15 characters or more may seem prohibitively long but are easily remembered if [passphrases are used](#), and passwords that length need not have complexity rules, which research shows tend to push people into poor password practices. After setting stringent password length requirements on the accounts, determine whether or not it is feasible to limit those systems to the internal network and access them remotely using a corporate VPN.

If a system does have to be accessible from the public internet via RDP, and using a VPN is not feasible, at least install MFA so that you are not relying on passwords alone for protection. However, be sure to use an MFA solution that is not SMS-based. Criminals have plenty of ways to thwart SMS-based authentication (often developed by malware authors targeting customers of banks in Europe, where SMS-based MFA has been used for many years to confirm banking transactions).

If you are forced to rely on passwords because MFA is not available — possibly due to shortsighted budgetary policy — at least stop would-be intruders making repeated attempts to guess credentials. Set a threshold of three invalid login attempts, after which no login attempts are recognized for a set period of time; for example, three minutes. In [Figure 3](#) you can see what this looks like in Windows.




Figure 5 // Account lockout policy

You can also change the RDP listening port from 3389 to something else to make accessible machines slightly harder for attackers to find. This can be done through system settings, but you will also need to change firewall rules to accommodate the designated port. Bear in mind that this is merely security by obscurity and should not be relied upon to keep RDP systems safe (see the section "[Securing RDP against ransomware](#)" for more details).

Hardening and patching should be performed for all remotely accessible devices. In addition to making sure that all security vulnerabilities are identified and remediated, you want to make sure that all non-essential services and components have been removed or disabled, and that settings are configured for maximum security.

For example, on Windows systems you can use Software Restriction Policies (SRP) to prevent files running from folders such as AppData and LocalAppData, which are sometimes used by malware. You can also use AppLocker to control which apps and files employees can run on their machines. Of course, the last line of defense against RDP ransomware is a comprehensive and well-tested backup and recovery system. Given that backup is key to surviving ransomware regardless of attack vector, it will be discussed after three more vectors, email, supply-chain, and vulnerabilities are considered.

Quick aside: SMB protocol, runner-up to RDP

The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, which is mainly used for file and printer sharing in enterprise networks, is also widely misused as a remote service through which ransomware can enter. In T1 2021, ESET technologies [blocked](#) 335 million brute-force attacks against public-facing SMB services. Although this represents a decline of 50% when compared with the last four months of 2020, attacks via SMB remain a prominent threat. Also, the WannaCryptor (aka WannaCry) ransomware, which comprised 41% of ransomware detections in the same T1 period, propagates by exploiting the vulnerable SMBv1 protocol.

Follow this advice to protect against threats targeting the SMB protocol:

- [Disable SMBv1 and SMBv2](#), keeping in mind that any existing dependencies on these outdated versions need to be handled.
- Upgrade to the latest version of the SMB protocol, which is currently SMBv3.
- Use Group Policy settings to ensure that SMB signing is required between hosts and Domain Controllers to prevent replay attacks on your network.
- Block TCP ports 445 and 139 and UDP ports 137 and 138 from the internet. This will prevent all versions of SMB from being accessible outside your network.

Securing RDP against ransomware

A collection of strategies and techniques to consider:

1. Document the problem

Make sure that all of your organization's internet-connected assets are known to the people who have been tasked with securing them. Have a process in place for ensuring that all new devices are included.

2. Limit exposed assets

Make sure that no digital assets are remotely accessible directly from the internet unless they have been approved for use in that manner and configured appropriately. Question why access to the asset cannot be provided via VPN. Disable RDP whenever it is not required (these articles show how on different versions of Microsoft Windows: [Server 2019](#); [Server 2016](#); [Server 2008/R2](#); [Windows 10](#); [Windows 8](#); [Windows 7](#)).

3. Protect exposed assets

If you absolutely, positively have to use RDP without a VPN, be sure that you do as many of the following as you can:

- a. Change the password to the user account you are connecting to on the remote machine regularly. Make sure that you change the default password that is sometimes automatically generated for cloud instances.
- b. Enforce password complexity (a long passphrase containing 15+ characters with no phrases related to the business, product names, or users is mandatory).
- c. Set an account lockout threshold to lock remote access after consecutive failed attempts to log in.

By setting your computer to lock an account for a period of time after a number of incorrect guesses, you will obstruct attackers who use automated password guessing tools (a brute-force attack). To set an account lockout policy in Windows:

Go to Start-->Programs-->Administrative Tools-->Local Security Policy

Under Account Policies-->Account Lockout Policies, set values for all three options – three invalid attempts with three-minute lockout durations are reasonable choices.

- d. Test and deploy patches for all known vulnerabilities and make sure that the most obvious culprits, such as BlueKeep and EternalBlue, are among the fixed flaws. If a computer cannot be patched, plan for its timely replacement.
- e. Use Network Level Authentication to enhance Remote Desktop Session Host security by requiring that the user be authenticated to the Remote Desktop Session Host server before a session is created.
- f. Change the default port for RDP away from port 3389, but note that this is merely security by obscurity and should not be the only measure you take.

To change the port, edit the following registry value (WARNING: do not try this unless you are familiar with the Windows Registry and TCP/IP): HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\PortNumber.

- g. Restrict which public IP addresses can connect via RDP. This can be burdensome if remote users do not have static IP addresses; for example, when traveling or working from home.
- h. Use more than one authentication factor. There are three possibilities: things you know, like usernames and passwords; things you are, like fingerprint or voiceprint; something you have, like your phone, which can receive a one-time passcode or run an authenticator app to generate one for you.

However, if using codes sent to phones as a second factor, avoid SMS codes because criminals have a history of defeating SMS-based authentication (as described in [this article](#)). There are good MFA solutions that leverage the ubiquity of phones but do not communicate via SMS (such as [ESET Secure Authentication](#)).

- i. Tighten up user permissions and rights. Disable files running from the AppData and LocalAppData folders. Block execution from the Temp subdirectory (part of the AppData tree by default). Block executable files running from the working directories of various decompression utilities (for example, WinZip or 7-Zip). Additionally, if you have a good endpoint protection product you can create HIPS rules to allow only certain applications to run on the computer and block all others by default).
- j. To access servers, use unique passwords for local accounts with admin rights (e.g., by using LAPS or a robust password manager service). In addition, restrict server access rights to a limited group of users. This reduces the attack surface of servers by limiting the number of users that can access them.
- k. Set the RDP client connection's encryption level to "high," if possible. If not, use the highest encryption level available for connections.
- l. Install a VPN gateway to broker all RDP connections from outside your local network.
- m. Password-protect your endpoint protection to prevent unauthenticated settings modification, disabling the protection, or even uninstalling the product (but use a different password from the one used for the RDP login credentials).
- n. Enable [exploitation blocking](#) in endpoint security software, which is a non-signature-based anomaly detection *technology* that monitors the behavior of commonly targeted applications.
- o. Isolate any insecure computer that needs to be accessed from the internet using RDP.
- p. If all staff and vendors are in the same country, or among a short list of countries, consider blocking access from excluded countries by instituting GeoIP blocking at the VPN gateway in order to prevent connections from foreign attackers.

RANSOMWARE VIA EMAIL

As any seasoned security expert will tell you: threats to information systems are cumulative. For example, just because some criminals have shifted their focus to remote-access-enabled servers as a ransomware attack vector does not mean you can ignore the other vectors. Some criminals are still using email attachments to install malware that serves as the initial stage of a compromise, which ends with ransomware.

They may use this vector to deliver downloaders that install malware on the email recipient's machine, or to establish a foothold on a networked machine within an organization. That foothold can be the basis of an attempt to steal valuable data and encrypt files throughout the organization, prior to making a very large ransom demand, as is often the case of targeted ransomware attacks via RDP.

In particular, email is one of the primary vectors for botnets, such as Trickbot, Qbot, and Dridex, which commonly use Microsoft Office documents with malicious macros for initial intrusion and ransomware as the final payload. Some of the previously seen relations between botnet and ransomware families include [Emotet](#) with Qbot, [Trickbot](#), [Ryuk](#), and Conti; [Dridex](#) with FriedEx (aka BitPaymer); [Nemuco](#) with [Avaddon](#), Dridex, Ursnif, and Trickbot; and [SmokeLoader and Zloader](#) with LockBit and Crysis.

Law enforcement took down [Emotet](#) at the start of the year 2021, which consequently saw a very strong decline of downloaders being spread via email. We describe the impacts of Emotet's campaigns, both before and after its takedown, in the [T1 2021 ESET Threat Report](#), in the [Q4 2020 ESET Threat Report](#), and in the [Q3 2020 ESET Threat Report](#).

Despite the significant decline of downloaders, malicious actors using compromised macros remained the top email threat in 2021. January even saw a spike of emails delivering malicious Office documents that led to Dridex and Emotet downloaders.

Another popular botnet, [Trickbot](#), faced a disruption in October 2020, yet it seems to have been only a temporary setback, as its operators launched a [new phishing campaign](#) as early as January 2021 aimed at legal and insurance companies in North America. It seems that further efforts will be necessary in the future to dispose of Trickbot for good.

When it comes to protecting your organization against ransomware attacks via email, the first line of defense is filtering all incoming email for spam and phishing messages. There were several good reasons for doing that even before email became a conduit for ransomware, and many organizations already have basic spam filtering and phishing detection in place.

You may want to go a step further and implement blocking of all attachment types that your business does not normally expect to receive via email; however, the suitability of this strategy will depend on the type of business you are in and may involve changing some work habits. For example, if employees are in the habit of emailing each other Excel spreadsheets and Word documents, the organization may need to adopt a secure file sharing solution or collaboration framework first, and transition staff to using that before being able to rigorously implement stricter email attachment filtering.

Make sure that all endpoints are running top-quality endpoint protection (EPP) software that will stop employees going to web pages that are known to be hosting malware. You may also want to use web content filtering as an added layer of protection. As well as blocking malicious websites, a web content filter can prevent employees from visiting websites deemed inappropriate for work use.

Your EPP should be centrally managed to enforce relevant security policies, such as limiting the ability to turn off endpoint protection or introduce removable media. Make sure that all endpoints are running the latest version of the product, and that it is successfully retrieving updates. If your EPP vendor has a cloud component, make sure this is turned on, because it enables even faster reaction to new threats. ESET calls this cloud component [LiveGrid®](#) and in some products [ESET Dynamic Threat Defense](#).

Managed service providers responsible for the settings of ESET products deployed on clients' networks can find anti-ransomware configuration tips [here](#).

Prompt and comprehensive patching of operating systems and applications will help to prevent ransomware entering via email attachments or drive-by downloads. Secure configuration can also be helpful. For example, consider using Group Policy to completely disable Microsoft Office macros. This will limit your ransomware attack surface, although this may not be feasible if the organization's workflow relies upon macros.

These days there can be little doubt that security is a shared responsibility, so make sure that your employee cybersecurity training is up to date and reflects the latest trends on the threatscape. As stated in ESET's free cybersecurity [awareness training](#): "You can reduce the number of malware incidents that your company has to deal with by letting employees know what to look for and what to avoid when it comes to phishing and other malicious content."

Make it clear to employees that they should report suspicious messages and attachments to the help desk or security team right away. In addition to the potential to prevent or limit damage, early warnings can help the organization tweak its spam and content filters and bolster its firewalls and other defenses.

RANSOMWARE VIA THE SUPPLY CHAIN

A ransomware attack vector that warrants close attention these days is the software supply chain. Just as ransomware dates back to the last century, so do software supply-chain risks. Back when the primary attack vector for computer viruses was computer disks, and computer disks were the main way that people acquired software, malware would sometimes end up on production disks, or on the disks of trial software that used to be distributed with computer magazines.

In 2017 ESET [discovered](#) that a legitimate accounting software was [used by criminals to push the NotPetya/DiskCoder.C malware](#). The attackers penetrated the software company's update servers and added their own code to legitimate application update files. When users of the accounting software clicked to install program updates, they were also installing a malware backdoor, opening the way for what became the most devastating cyberattack in history. The first line of defense against this type of attack is a good endpoint protection product, backed up by EDR tools.

Thus, due to the complex impacts and mitigations these attacks can unleash and subsequently require, researchers and security admins are on the lookout. [July 2, 2021 saw a set of events transpire with Kaseya's IT management software for MSPs](#) that demonstrated the characteristics of a supply-chain ransomware attack leveraging the Win32/Filecoder.Sodinokibi.N trojan. Subsequent investigation has shown that the incident was based on exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability, yet the supply-chain label elicited a quick reaction. Kaseya, for its part, has rushed to triage the incident and pushed out notifications to those potentially affected with the advice to shut potentially affected on-premises VSA servers down immediately.

The growing intensity of supply-chain attacks is also documented by the number of [published](#) ESET research articles where this attack vector was used. Between November 2020 and February 2021 there were four supply-chain attack cases discovered exclusively by ESET — a very high number compared to previous years.

Defending against this type of attack involves keeping up with patches, using endpoint protection software, leveraging [EDR solutions](#), and educating users about unsolicited emails that encourage them to visit unfamiliar websites.

RANSOMWARE VIA EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES

While cybercriminals can benefit from both known and unknown vulnerabilities, laying hands on zero-day vulnerabilities generally belongs to the world of APT groups and state-sponsored actors. Despite the threat of zero days, known vulnerabilities provide more than enough headache for security admins, researchers, and business owners alike.

Case in point is the fact that almost all cybersecurity vendors still detect the EternalBlue exploit (2017) and its many variants, as well as ongoing exploitation based on Microsoft's SMBv1 file-sharing protocol. The long shelf life of the vulnerabilities and threats like WannaCryptor (aka WannaCry) usually trace to poor updates and patch management at businesses and institutions.

In parallel, the increasing complexity of the threatscape has yielded new tools to fight more modern threats, but these too come with additional technical burdens — looking out for product vulnerabilities and pursuing careful patch management.

The huge rise in use of, and dependence on, VPNs in business and for personal use stands out. Here, two cases spring to mind where vulnerabilities identified in [Pulse Secure's](#) and [Fortinet's](#) VPN services allowed for the proliferation of ransomware among customers. The use of VPN at large institutions and businesses, while highly effective, adds an additional responsibility with regard to updating the product as required. This focus on timely updates should be pursued with employment of multi-factor authentication when signing in to their respective VPN services. Where suspicions of credential abuse arise, organizations should pursue comprehensive account resets.

These challenges are also echoed in the global upsurge in use of large productivity and collaboration platforms. In March 2021, a frenzy of activity erupted among threat actors, leading software vendors, and the wider cybersecurity industry when it was discovered that Microsoft rushed out emergency updates to address four zero-day flaws affecting Microsoft Exchange Server versions 2013, 2016, and 2019. Subsequently, threat actors were observed exploiting the vulnerabilities in the wild to access on-premises Exchange servers, which allowed them to steal emails, download data, and compromise machines with malware for long-term access to the victim networks.

This large-scale event ultimately saw [Exchange servers under siege from at least 10 APT groups](#). ESET researchers' thoughts quickly turned to understanding how many organizations would have been probed and infiltrated for future attacks including ransomware. The likely mechanism? With a foothold on a Microsoft Exchange server, attackers would have very privileged access to a company — possibly admin rights — and then, in time, plan an upcoming attack.

As previously mentioned in the section on supply-chain attacks above, the Kaseya VSA ransomware [attack](#) affected over 50 MSPs with impacts on over 1,000 end customers. The attackers used a number of zero-day vulnerabilities — including CVE-2021-30116 — to compromise the Kaseya VSA IT management software, a popular tool among MSPs. The attackers claimed to have hit over a million systems, which could be an exaggeration. ESET telemetry revealed victims in 17 countries, including the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada, Germany, and the United States.

While the early indications of Kaseya's troubles being a supply-chain attack were not borne out, a zero-day attack of this sort is very serious and indeed did produce downstream supply chain effects. In short due to the popularity of Kaseya systems, impacts were recorded to businesses only tangentially connected to their VSA platform for MSPs. As of July 2, Scandinavian supermarket chain Coop took steps to shut down approximately 500 stores due to the fact that the third-party payment processor and [supplier of their checkout/POS](#) system was based on Kaseya-hosted systems. So, while Coop was not directly affected, it was still significantly impacted through its dependence on another service that was shut down due to the Kaseya attack.

IT Admins, CISOs, and C-suite managers should have taken notice at the scale and impact of both the Microsoft Exchange and Kaseya incidents, to refresh their focus on both the threat environment and business impact that ransomware can have. For further reference, please see some of the most frequently mentioned vulnerabilities in public reports:

- [Kaseya VSA](#)
- [Pulse Connect Secure](#)
- [Citrix Hypervisor](#)
- [Fortinet VPN](#)
- Microsoft Exchange Server — See the featured story in our latest [threat report](#).
- [Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway](#)
- [Microsoft Office Common Controls](#)
- [Windows Win32k](#)
- [Accellion File Transfer Appliance](#)

CLOUDS AND SEGMENTS

Whatever attack vector is employed by ransomware, if it gets into your organization there is a fair chance it will try to spread to as many machines as possible, possibly impacting all of your company's operations. Clearly, limiting the number of machines that an attacker can reach from a single entry point has significant benefits as a defensive strategy. There are several approaches to implementing such a strategy, notably network segmentation.

A discussion of network architecture is beyond the scope of this paper, and converting a broad and easily traversable "flat" network into a segmented one can be both challenging and expensive (this [KPMG report](#) provides a useful perspective). However, every organization needs to understand the security strengths and weaknesses of its current network architecture. A simple, interview-based audit can improve that understanding by asking "Can I get from here to there?" or "What is stopping someone from getting from there to here?"

A popular system architecture strategy in recent years has been to move data to the cloud, but the cloud provides no automatic immunity from ransomware attacks (despite efforts by less scrupulous vendors to create the impression that cloud = security). In fact, the low cost and relative ease with which new servers can be provisioned in the cloud and connected to the rest of the organization's digital infrastructure has made the cloud a fertile hunting ground for criminals. Clearly, any use of the cloud by any part of the organization needs to be properly authorized and securely configured. Also, like all other systems, those in the cloud need to be enrolled in an appropriate backup and recovery regimen.

PATCHING AND BACKUP AS RANSOMWARE DEFENSE

Patching and backup are two aspects of operating and administering systems that play vital roles in defending against a ransomware attack. Patching of systems closes off potential avenues of attack and can prevent ransomware from getting into your organization — or if it does get in, reduce the damage it can do.

Of course, as any system administrator knows, patching can be a lot more complicated than it sounds. Patches and updates need to be tested before they are deployed. Some of your organization's systems may have software dependencies that are broken by upgrading to the latest version of an application or operating system. However, the high price of ransomware getting into your network justifies the effort to address those challenges and maintain a prompt and thorough patching regimen to keep ransomware out.

It is often said that if ransomware does get into your organization — be it via RDP, email, the software supply chain, or malicious insider — a comprehensive and properly managed backup and recovery program is a vital defense mechanism and crucial for your recovery efforts.

There is a lot of truth to this — and a lot of good reasons to have such a program — but bear in mind that some ransomware attacks are executed over a period of time, during which the ransomware may also be backed up, compromising the potential for a smooth recovery. That is why backup is not a set-and-forget defense; it needs to be monitored and managed, and the recovery process needs to be regularly tested.

These days there are more options than ever for backup and recovery, notably cloud storage, whether remote, on-premises, or hybrid. However, there is also more data to be backed up, from more places. Unless you have a comprehensive backup strategy there is always a chance that the purveyors of ransomware will find that one device that you did not back up.

According to the backup experts at Xopero, a member of the [ESET Technology Alliance](#), comprehensive backup includes data and system state on all endpoints, servers, mailboxes, network drives, mobile devices, and virtual machines.

Detailed discussion of enterprise backup and recovery strategy is beyond the scope of this white paper, but it should be clear that having such a strategy is more critical than ever. Ransomware simply adds to the long list of reasons your organization should not skimp on this part of the IT program. However, there are some caveats specific to ransomware. For example, when storage is “always on,” its contents may be vulnerable to compromise by ransomware in the same way that local and other network-connected storage is.

To avoid ransomware from traversing it, opt for off-site storage that:

- is not routinely and permanently online;
- protects backed-up data from automatic and silent modification or overwriting by malware when the remote facility is online;
- protects earlier generations of backed-up data from compromise so that even if disaster strikes the very latest backups, you can at least retrieve some data, including earlier versions of current data; and
- protects the customer by spelling out the provider’s legal/contractual responsibilities, what happens if the provider goes out of business, and so on.

Don’t underestimate the usefulness of write-once media for archiving data too. Files stored on media that is not rewritable are immune from the predations of ransomware.

Of course, there are many other reasons why your organization needs a backup and recovery program — such as recovery from fire, flood, storm damage, and so on.

RESPONDING TO A RANSOMWARE ATTACK

In addition to erecting defenses against ransomware, every organization needs to be prepared to respond to any attack that succeeds in penetrating those defenses. Fundamental to this preparation are company security policies updated to cover ransomware. You need to spell out how employees at all levels should respond to ransomware demands. Make sure your policies answer these questions:

- To whom should employees report suspected ransomware?
- What is company policy on paying ransomware demands?
- Who is allowed to pay/negotiate ransom payments? Policies should be crafted to avoid the following problems:
 - Employees not reporting suspected ransomware for fear of retribution.
 - Network admins paying ransoms because it is easier than recovering systems from backups.
 - Unauthorized release of information about actual or suspected ransomware attacks.
- What steps are the organization obliged to take in case of a data breach?
- What is company policy on powering down affected machines? Who makes this call? Powering down machines eliminates potential evidence stored in memory and may be considered as not compliant with regulations.

After updating your information security policies to address ransomware, you need to make sure that your security awareness and employee training programs include appropriate ransomware-related content.

You will also want to make sure your Disaster Recovery, Incident/Crisis Response plans are prepared in case of a ransomware attack. Here's an outline of the ground your response plan needs to cover:

- At first signs of attack, notify designated personnel
- Isolate and analyze affected machines
- Powering down: If isolating affected machines is not possible, take a system image and memory capture, then power them down to avoid further spread of the ransomware attack
- Once the attack is confirmed, activate your Incident/Crisis Response Team
- Alert legal counsel
- Contact vendors who may be able to assist
- Remind employees of press and social media policy
- Assess attack scope and specifics of ransomware (e.g., if a key is available)
- Contact law enforcement
- Prepare a holding statement
- If files have been encrypted, determine whether they can be restored from backup
- Keep employees updated on status
- If necessary, activate your business continuity plan
- Collect relevant logs and possible indicators of compromise, such as binaries, ransom demand notes, IP addresses, registry entries, or other files
- Document the initial investigation of the attack and the steps taken to remediate it

It is a good idea to have at least one ransomware scenario in your crisis planning playbook and to go through it in a tabletop exercise with relevant personnel, including executives. This can reveal gaps in backup and recovery plans, and help you anticipate the impact of not being able to access basic services due to systems being encrypted (services like email, VoIP phones, and internet access).

ENDPOINT DETECTION AND RESPONSE

There is one category of security software that can help limit the impact of ransomware attacks and strengthen your response to them: endpoint detection and response tools, or EDR for brevity. Either as a collection of internally developed tools or an integrated security product, EDR can be used to assist manual threat-hunting efforts on your networks as well as automate a wide range of defensive measures.

In [Figure 6](#), you can see several ransomware-related EDR rules designed to alert security personnel to suspicious activity (this particular EDR is [ESET Enterprise Inspector](#)).

RULE NAME (56)	SEVERITY SCORE	TAGS	CATEGORY	ENABLED	VALID	LAST CHANGE DATE	SEVERITY	HIT COUNT
File used by DiskCrypter application has been written [00618]	89	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:42 AM	High	0
File encrypts and deletes files [00611]	84	MITRE Tactic Coll... MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware Beh... Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	0
Archive Utility (Zip) encrypting and deleting files [00610]	84	Data Encryption MITRE Tactic Coll... MITRE Tactic Imp... Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:43 AM	High	0
Archive Utility (PKZIP) encrypting and deleting files [00609]	84	Data Encryption MITRE Tactic Coll... MITRE Tactic Imp... Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:43 AM	High	0
Filecoder behavior [00607]	81	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware Beh... Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:45 AM	High	6
Filecoder behavior [00608]	81	MITRE Tactic Imp... New	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:45 AM	High	0
File with extension used by Win32/Filecoder BTCWare has been written [00615]	80	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	0
Win32/Filecoder WannaCryptor client has been started [00616]	80	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	0
File with extension used by Win32/Filecoder Crysis has been written [00613]	80	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	0
File with extension used by Win32/Filecoder CandyCrack has been written [00605]	80	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	0
File with extension used by Win32/Filecoder HydraCrypt has been written [00604]	80	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	0
Ransomware behavioral detection - filecoder [00619]	80	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:42 AM	High	2
File used by Win32/DiskCrypter D has been written [00617]	80	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	0
File used by Win32/DiskCrypter C has been written [00616]	80	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	0
Compromised files [00620]	79	MITRE Tactic Coll... MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware Beh... Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	2
Indicators: The user session - Mimikatz [00614]	78	MITRE Tactic Imp... Ransomware IOC Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:41 AM	High	5
File with unexpected extension is written into destination folder [00621]	73	MITRE Tactic Imp... Suspicious File Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:42 AM	High	920
Archive Utility (Zip) encrypting files [00606]	70	Data Encryption MITRE Tactic Coll... MITRE Tactic Imp... Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:43 AM	High	0
Archive Utility (PKZIP) encrypting files [00604]	70	Data Encryption MITRE Tactic Coll... MITRE Tactic Imp... Updated	Ransomware / Filecoders	Enabled	Valid	Jun 2, 2021, 7:07:43 AM	High	0

Figure 6 // ESET Enterprise Inspector dashboard with ransomware-related rules

An EDR tool can monitor all of your organization's endpoints for anomalous and suspicious activity, like the changing of file extensions typically seen in a ransomware attack. Your security team would definitely like to be alerted to the presence of attack tools like Mimikatz, created to steal user credentials from memory, or Cobalt Strike beacon, often used by attackers to establish a foothold in the system and remotely execute commands.

Early warning signs of intrusion can be coded into rules and alarms. These can be continually refined with fresh data from threat intelligence sources such as lists of indicators of compromise (IoCs). A good EDR will have rules that enable the operator to find compromised systems immediately once a rule is triggered, isolate those systems, and then diagnose the problem, including rolling back the history of commands executed by the affected systems. These capabilities mean EDR can increase your security team's ability to thwart attacks, respond to attacks, and perform forensic analysis after an attack.

A WORD ABOUT RANSOMWARE PAYMENT

That word is: don't. Why? Because [*paying the criminal who has encrypted your files means*](#):

- You are validating the business model behind the crime
- You are encouraging further criminal activity
- You are allowing ransomware gangs to research zero-day vulnerabilities and develop new exploits
- You may be hit with future attacks and further demands for money

Furthermore, paying the criminals who have encrypted your files by no means guarantees that you will get the decryption key; after all, it's not like you can take them to court or report them to the Better Business Bureau. There are numerous reasons that paying may not get your files back:

- Some of the data might have been corrupted in the encryption process and is thus not recoverable
- The provided decrypting tool might be bundled with other malware, does not work properly, or is much slower than recovery from backups
- There are numerous ways in which the process for delivering the decryption key fails
- The attacker is acting in bad faith and has [*no plans to provide decryption keys*](#)

The above should be sufficient to deter organizations from paying ransomware demands, but to underline this advice, here is what the FBI [*says*](#) about paying: "Paying a ransom doesn't guarantee an organization that it will get its data back — we've seen cases where organizations never got a decryption key after having paid the ransom. Paying a ransom not only emboldens current cyber criminals to target more organizations, it also offers an incentive for other criminals to get involved in this type of illegal activity. And finally, by paying a ransom, an organization might inadvertently be funding other [*illicit activity associated with criminals*](#)."

In practice there appear to be two arguments for paying the ransom, the first being "we cannot restore the encrypted information from backups." This could be because the backups do not exist, or they exist but are incomplete or damaged in some way. However, there may be alternatives to paying up. So before you decide to send the money, check with your security software vendor (a) in case this is one of the rare situations where a decryption tool is available, making recovery possible without paying the ransom, and (b) in case it's known that paying the ransom won't or can't result in recovery for that particular ransomware variant.

The second common argument for paying the ransom is that "it's cheaper than restoring from backups." If this statement is based solely on time and labor calculations, it might be technically correct, but the decision to pay is nevertheless deeply flawed for the reasons stated earlier, notably the unreliability of decryption promises, the probability of being attacked again after the first payment — after all, you are not dealing with law-abiding citizens — and that you are supporting a criminal exercise and thus making further attacks on others more likely as well.

You may have heard that some purveyors of ransomware offer victims proof that the decryption works. This does happen but can lead to even more problems. Suppose the attackers have you send them an encrypted file that they then decrypt and send back to you as evidence of good faith; you have just facilitated disclosure of the contents of that file to persons of dubious moral character and, should any personally identifiable information be contained in that data, likely committed an offense under one or more of the burgeoning set of tightened national and regional privacy laws.

Also, bear in mind that removing active ransomware with security software is by no means the same as recovering data. Removing the ransomware and then deciding to pay up means that the data may no longer be recoverable even with the cooperation of the criminals, because the decryption mechanism is often part of the malware. In other words, if you decide to pay, proceed with caution.

THE FUTURE OF RANSOMWARE

Demanding money to restore access to systems and data targets the “A” in CIA, the classic security triad of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. In essence, ransomware leverages an organization’s dependence on technology, and so the more that organizations come to depend upon technology, the greater the scope for ransomware. That means we can expect ransomware to persist and evolve in the future (barring unforeseen shifts in global politics and economics).

Based on our experience with malicious code since the late 1980s, we can say that malware threats tend to evolve like this:

- vulnerabilities in a new technology are discovered and their potential for criminal abuse is discussed;
- efforts to remediate and mitigate those vulnerabilities begin;
- attempts at criminal abuse of the latest technology are at first rare because criminals are making easy money from established strategies;
- absent widespread criminal abuse, remediation and mitigation efforts lose steam;
- eventually criminals discover that this “new” technology is ripe for exploitation;
- a new malware trend emerges.

Examples include distributed denial-of-service attacks that leverage internet-connected surveillance equipment (Mirai) and the emergence of router malware (VPNFilter). In terms of ransomware, the explosive growth in the deployment of poorly secured IoT (internet of things) devices is creating a fertile landscape for future efforts, as is the increasing use of internet-connected industrial control systems, smart buildings, and vehicles, including autonomous vehicles (see the article “[RoT: Ransomware of Things](#)” and the webinar “[Ransomware from the Dark Side](#)”).

Several scenarios are plausible if a drop in the revenues from more established cybercrimes leads criminals to pursue new schemes. Malware on routers could potentially limit or block traffic until a toll is paid, backed by threats to brick the router, or reveal traffic content, if you try to remove the malware.

Remote locking of vehicles, homes, and buildings could be abused for extortion. Manipulation of BAS (building automation systems), which can control building access, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, could serve as a basis for extortion schemes, and [we are seeing signs of this already](#). As for commercial robots, the feasibility of ransomware attacks on them has already been demonstrated.

These evolving ransomware scenarios have multiple implications for enterprises. The following responses are recommended:

- Start to address these potential threats in your risk management strategy and planning
- Begin to get a handle on “ransomable” assets now: IoT devices, SOHO routers, robots, control systems, autonomous systems
- Track vulnerability reports related to these assets
- Keep up with patches and firmware updates for these assets
- Segment IoT devices and other new technologies from production networks

CONCLUSION

The data, techniques, and real-world cases presented in this paper show that ransomware really has become the cyberthreat of the day. Its rise can largely be attributed to the development of the double extortion (or doxing) technique, pioneered in 2019 by the now-defunct Maze gang. On top of encrypting their victims' devices, the operators of this infamous ransomware group also stole their victims' most valuable and sensitive pieces of data and threatened to publish it.

Other ransomware actors soon followed suit, building further upon this effective double-extortion foundation. New methods were introduced, targeting not just the victims' data, but also their websites, employees, business partners, and customers, increasing pressure and thus willingness to pay up.

Taking advantage of the chaos and insecurity of the pandemic, ransomware gangs also started brute-forcing access via RDP, eventually transforming it into one of their main attack avenues. However, [malspam](#) campaigns delivering malicious macros, dangerous links, and botnet binaries didn't go away, bombarding potential victims on top of the billions of password-guessing attacks.

Due to the increased effectiveness of the extortion techniques and new distribution channels, hundreds of millions of dollars are estimated to have ended up in the accounts of these technically skilled cybercriminals, allowing them to build up their ransomware as a service business model and onboard numerous new affiliates. Relieved of the "dirty work," some of the gangs started acquiring zero-day vulnerabilities and buying stolen credentials, further expanding the pool of potential victims.

The growing number of ransomware incidents indirectly connected to supply-chain attacks represents another worrying trend that might indicate the direction in which these gangs will head next.

With money, ambition, and focus mostly on the side of ransomware gangs, learning from the nightmare stories and analyses reported daily in the media has become a must for any IT and security professional. It has been demonstrated time and time again since the beginning of 2020 that enforced policies, proper configuration, and strong passwords combined with multi-factor authentication can be the decisive elements in the fight against ransomware. Many of the incidents named in this paper also highlighted the importance of timely patching, as known vulnerabilities are among the go-to vectors of these gangs.

To counter zero-day vulnerabilities, botnets, malspam, and other, more technically advanced techniques, additional security technologies are needed: a multi-layered endpoint protection solution, able to detect and block incoming threats in email, links, RDP, and other network protocols; and endpoint detection and response tools to monitor, identify, and isolate anomalies and signs of malicious activity in an organization's environment.

New technologies, while bringing benefits to society, also constitute an ever-expanding field of opportunity for cybercriminals. Hopefully, by explaining how serious a threat ransomware has become and what can be done to defend against it, this paper will help to secure those benefits, while minimizing losses caused by bad actors.

